* Lukas Muntingh is co-founder and project coordinator of Africa
Criminal Justice Reform (ACJR), formerly the Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative (CSPRI), as ACJR was known from 2003 until 2017. He holds a PhD (Law) from UWC and an MA (Sociology) from Stellenbosch University. He has been involved in criminal justice reform since 1992 and has worked in Southern and East Africa on child justice, prisoners' rights, preventing corruption in the prison system, the prevention and combating of torture, and monitoring legislative compliance. His current focus is on the prevention and combating of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners and detainees. In South Africa, the powers that provincial governments hold over the South African Police Service (SAPS), a national competency, were reduced from what was contained in the Interim Constitution (1993) to the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1996. 1 Under the Interim Constitution, the SAPS functioned 'under the direction of the national government as well as the various provincial governments', 2 reflecting a dual responsibility with devolved authority. Provincial authority over the SAPS has now been reduced from provinces being responsible for 'directing' with national government, to the current situation which sees them with 'monitoring, overseeing and liaising' functions set out in section 206(3) of the Constitution. There is therefore a centralisation of authority in national government.
In 2009 the Democratic Alliance (DA) assumed power in the Western Cape, taking over from the African National Congress (ANC), making the Western Cape the only opposition-held province in the country. Since 2011 the Western Cape government has commenced with a number of initiatives to address crime and safety, such as provincial safety legislation and monitoring work done by the provincial department of community safety. These initiatives were aimed at improving the monitoring of police performance in order to bring about greater accountability and address the quality of policing. Specifically, these mechanisms have been aimed at exploring and utilising constitutionally mandated powers with reference to 'monitoring, overseeing and liaising functions', limited as they may be, with reference to the SAPS. The appointment of the Khayelitsha Commission in 2012 to investigate the breakdown of police-community relations in that township, 3 and the passing of the Western Cape Community Safety Act 4 (WCCSA) in 2013 were significant developments in this regard, and are seen as attempts to push back the centralised control over police performance.
The Khayelitsha Commission was established by the Premier of the Western Cape to investigate allegations of inefficiency at the three Khayelitsha police stations and allegations that there had been a breakdown in the relationship between the community and the police. 5 The commission found that there were indeed a range of deep-seated problems relating to inefficiencies in the police, underinvestigation of reported crimes and poor general management in the police, to name but a few. Dissatisfied with the quality of policing in the province, the provincial legislature passed the WCCSA to strengthen, among others, the provincial government's oversight role over the SAPS. In doing so it explored the limited space offered by the Constitution to strengthen police accountability and improve police performance in respect of crime and safety in the province.
The WCCSA created, among others, the Western Cape Police Ombudsman (Ombudsman), a complaints mechanism accessible to the general public that became operational at the end of 2015. It is the only one of its kind in the country. Evaluated against the history of police oversight in South Africa after 1994, this article investigates the establishment of the Ombudsman and its performance since its inception.
The establishment of an independent police investigative mechanism was a requirement set in the Interim Constitution 6 and subsequently in as questions around the equitable allocation of police resources were a key finding from the Khayelitsha Commission. 14 The following section provides more information on the policing context in the Western Cape, followed by a discussion of the legal framework that gave rise to the Ombudsman. This is followed by a description of the power of the Ombudsman and an evaluation of its performance since its establishment. The article concludes with an assessment of its future prospects and challenges.
Context of policing in the province
The Khayelitsha Commission clearly placed the quality of policing in the Western Cape on the political agenda. National government unsuccessfully attempted to block the establishment of the commission, first in the Cape High Court and later in the Constitutional Court. 15 The establishment of the Khayelitsha Commission was preceded by numerous attempts by the Western Cape government, starting in November 2011, to engage the national government on a range of problems with policing in Khayelitsha as identified by a group of non-governmental organisations. 16 These efforts did not have the desired effect and in August 2012 the commission was appointed, although activities were delayed for nearly a year while the constitutional challenge brought by the Minister of Police was finalised. 17 While the litigation around the Khayelitsha Commission attracted significant attention, the passing, in April 2013, of the WCCSA took place with relatively little attention from the media and national government, although it was rumoured at one stage that this was also heading for the Constitutional Court with then Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, threatening to challenge its constitutionality. 18 The developments in the opposition-held Western Cape at provincial level as well as metro level must be viewed as an attempt by that provincial government to roll back the highly centralised nature of policing in the country. 19 Seen historically, the centralisation of policing was on the one hand motivated by a need to bring the various homeland police forces and the South African Police under central control, but also by a fear that regional militias and armies might arise out of the transition to democracy. 20 In recent years there have also been calls from the ANC, and proposed as such in the White Paper on Policing, that the metro police services should also come under SAPS control; however, this proposal has met strong resistance. 21 The Western Cape, and specifically the Cape Metropole, have a particularly serious violent crime problem. For example, from 2010 to 2016 murder increased by 47% and car hijacking by 382%. 22 With the SAPS evidently failing to meet safety and security needs, the Western Cape government embarked on a different strategy by passing its own legislation from which community-based initiatives and new structures flowed, placing the emphasis on greater transparency and accountability through concerted monitoring. It is evident that the Western Cape's DA-led government is not satisfied with the quality of policing, and it has been progressive in exploring the legal avenues available to it in the Constitution. The establishment of the Khayelitsha Commission and the passing of the WCCSA are examples of these efforts. Another unique outflow of this process of constitutional exploration is the establishment of the Ombudsman.
Western Cape Constitution
The Western Cape Community Safety Act (Act 3 of 2013) An ombudsman is a public sector institution which, for the purpose of the protection of individual rights and the defence of the fundamental rights of democracy such as civil and human rights, is authorized by a parliament, a ministry or a subdivision thereof (legal foundation) to investigate independently both own-motion as well as complaints from citizens about an alleged part of the administration's/executive's acts, omissions, improprieties, and broader systemic problems, and whose only tools -due to not being invested with any executive power -are its own personal authority, recommendations, annual and special reports and the media. 29 Section 67(1) of the Western Cape Constitution empowers the province to pass any legislation to carry out the functions listed in section 66(1) of the Constitution, which include the police monitoring and related functions. Section 3 of the WCCSA mandates the provincial Minister for Community Safety to exercise a fairly broad range of powers centring on three main foci: monitoring police performance; overseeing the effectiveness and efficiency of the police; and building good relations between the police and other stakeholders. Section 3(l) of the WCCSA mandates the provincial Minister to 'record complaints relating to police inefficiency or a breakdown of relations between the police and the community'. The recording of complaints is understood to fall under the provincial Minister's broader mandate to build good relations between the police and the community, although it may equally be regarded as part of its monitoring function. It is consequently section 3(l) of the WCCSA, read with sections 66(1) and 67(1) of the Western Cape Constitution, that gave rise to the Ombudsman. Even though the creation in law of the Ombudsman preceded the Khayelitsha Commission finalising its work, there was already sufficient information in the public domain on poor police-community relations and police inefficiencies to justify its creation.
The Ombudsman in the WCCSA
The WCCSA mandates the Premier to appoint the Ombudsman after consultation with the provincial Minister, the Provincial Commissioner of Police and the executive heads of municipal police services. The appointment is further subject to approval by the provincial parliament's standing committee responsible for community safety by a resolution adopted in accordance with its rules. 30 The only requirement is that the Ombudsman must be a suitably qualified person with experience in law or policing. Unlike the Public Protector, the Ombudsman does not need a minimum number of years of experience or have specified qualifications. 31 The Ombudsman is further appointed for a non-renewable term of five years. The Premier may remove the Ombudsman from office for good cause after consultation with the provincial Minister, the Provincial Commissioner of Police and the executive heads of municipal police services. Again, this is subject to approval by the provincial parliament's standing committee responsible for community safety by a resolution adopted in accordance with its rules. The committee may recommend the removal of the Ombudsman from office on the grounds of misbehaviour, incapacity or incompetence, after affording him or her a reasonable opportunity to be heard. 32 The Ombudsman and staff members of the office are also obliged to serve independently and impartially, and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 33 The Ombudsman's budget is voted on by the provincial parliament as part of the budget of the Department of Community Safety. 34 Being part of the departmental budget may impact on the Ombudsman's independence, as has been noted in respect of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services. 35 The difference is, however, that the Ombudsman does not oversee the department it receives its budget from, but is instead funded through a department that is part of the monitoring and oversight architecture over the SAPS in the province. The Ombudsman may also be assisted by a person whose service the Ombudsman requires for the purpose of a particular investigation. 36 The first Ombudsman, Adv. Vusi Pikoli, was appointed on 1 December 2014 and 2015/16 was its first full financial year, during which it was allocated a budget of just below R7 million. 37 
Powers of the Ombudsman
The central function of the Ombudsman is to 'receive and … investigate complaints submitted in terms of section 16, regarding inefficiency of the police or a breakdown in relations between the police and any community'. 38 It is therefore a reactive mechanism and does not have the power to investigate of its own volition, unlike the Inspecting Judge for Correctional Services 39 or the Public Protector. 40 In order to resolve a complaint, if it is not manifestly frivolous, the Ombudsman has a number of avenues open to him or her. The first, and assuming there is sufficient information, is to refer the complaint to a more appropriate and competent authority, which may be a national authority, communitypolicing forum (CPF), a constitutional authority or provincial authority. Second, if the complaint is deemed to be of a serious nature or it may be dealt with more appropriately by a commission of inquiry, a recommendation to this effect may be made to the Premier. Third, the Ombudsman may decide to investigate the complaint. 41 In order to conduct an investigation, the Act affords the Ombudsman two broad powers established under section 18 of the Act:
42 18 (1) The Ombudsman may direct any person to submit an affidavit or affirmed declaration or to appear before him or her to give evidence or to produce any document in that person's possession or under his or her control which has a bearing on the matter being investigated, and may question that person thereon.
18(2)
The Ombudsman may request an explanation from any person whom he or she reasonably suspects of having information which has a bearing on the matter being investigated or to be investigated.
The regulations to the Act bolster these powers further by adding that the Ombudsman may have meetings with affected persons who may have information relevant to the complaint; conduct research; conduct inspections in loco; and administer surveys. 43 Further, the regulations also provide that the Ombudsman may engage in negotiations and conciliation if necessary. 44 Unlike a judicial commission of inquiry (e.g. the Khayelitsha Commission) the Ombudsman does not have the explicit power to subpoena, and a number of mechanisms are included to ensure cooperation. The strongest of these is the provision that if a person fails to cooperate, fails to answer questions, provides false information, or hinders or obstructs the Ombudsman's investigation, such a person is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period of up to three years. 45 Further, failure by a police official or any other state official to cooperate must be reported to the Provincial Commissioner, executive head of the relevant municipal police, as the case may be, and the provincial Minister. 46 If, upon completion of an investigation, the matter cannot be resolved, the Ombudsman must submit his recommendation to the provincial Minister and inform the complainant accordingly. The provincial Minister must make a recommendation to the Minister of Police on any investigated complaints that could not be resolved by the Ombudsman, and inform the complainant accordingly. 47 It is apparent that the recommendations from the Ombudsman do not have binding power on the provincial commissioner, as there is no constitutional basis for such power and the provincial commissioner takes instruction from the national commissioner and not the provincial government. The Ombudsman also does not have remedial powers, unlike the Public Protector. 48 This is, however, not to say that the recommendations of the Ombudsman are without power or authority. That power is not in a direct relationship with the provincial commissioner, but rather through the provincial Minister and ultimately the provincial parliament. The provincial Minister must make a recommendation to the national Minister on investigated complaints that could not be resolved by the Ombudsman. 49 The provincial legislature and executive therefore hold considerable authority over the provincial commissioner once it becomes apparent that recommendations from the Ombudsman are ignored or good reasons are not provided for not implementing them. The provincial commissioner must, on a regular basis, report to the provincial parliament on a number of predetermined issues, as well as on any other matter that the provincial parliament may request. 50 It should further be borne in mind that the provincial commissioner is appointed by the national commissioner with the concurrence of the provincial executive, and a special relationship therefore exists between the two parties. 51 It is therefore indeed possible that the provincial parliament can place significant pressure on the provincial commissioner. Read together, the Constitution, Western Cape Constitution and the WCCSA provide for the provincial parliament, if it has lost confidence in the provincial commissioner, to call him or her to appear before it or any of its committees, prior to starting disciplinary action or proceedings for his or her dismissal or transfer. 52 In an opposition-held province, the provincial executive and legislature are far more likely to thoroughly utilise this oversight function to bring about an improvement in crime and safety, and the Ombudsman forms part of this dispensation. For example, by 2016 the provincial Department of Community Safety was monitoring 25 courts in order to identify police inefficiencies in criminal investigations and docket management. 53 The Department of Community Safety has also established a police complaints centre to deal with service delivery complaints -a further initiative to deal with poor police community relations and improve accountability. 54 That the Western Cape has moved in this direction and has brought oversight to provincial level through law reform is at least in part motivated by frustration with the current centralised nature of policing, where the Western Cape provincial Minister of Community Safety has to compete with eight other provincial ministers for the national Minister's ear at Ministers and Members of Executive Councils (MINMEC) meetings. 55 Crime and safety in the Western Cape has certain unique features (e.g. gangsterism on the Cape Flats) and requires a more tailored response from the SAPS, but that has not been forthcoming in recent years. The Ombudsman's power and authority is therefore highly dependent on an effective provincial government taking its oversight responsibilities seriously. A provincial government that is tardy in overseeing the police would probably render the Ombudsman obsolete. Should the Western Cape revert to ANC control, it may hold significant consequences for police oversight and monitoring, including the role and authority of the Ombudsman. The current situation of natural tension between the national government and an opposition-held province, a result of normal democratic processes, is indeed beneficial for police accountability.
Achievements and performance
The WCCSA requires the Ombudsman to report annually to the MEC on the number of complaints investigated; the number of complaints determined to be manifestly frivolous or vexatious; the outcome of investigations into the complaints; and the recommendations regarding the investigated complaints. This data points to modest beginnings indeed, if we bear in mind there are 150 police stations in the province, 18 020 police officials, 57 and a population of 6.2 million people. 58 As noted already, the Ombudsman received 399 complaints in its first year and the actions taken on these are reflected in Table 1 . 59 Nearly 80% of complaints were investigated, but only 17% resulted in a report. This may be a result of investigations taking unexpectedly long, which may mean that some cases will be carried forward to (and reported on in) the next financial year. The Ombudsman's report notes that some complaints are dealt with in a matter of days but that others require lengthy investigation in order to understand the 'intricacies associated with complex issues'. 60 The Ombudsman's office has a small staff and only four people are dedicated to investigations. This, combined with being a new institution that is in the process of establishing its work methods, may have further contributed to the low proportion of reports produced. Complaints originated from all over the province, but the top five areas of origin are given in Table 2 . It should be noted that in 20 complaints the area of origin was unknown.
It is nonetheless encouraging that four of the five areas listed in Table 2 are in crime-ridden and impoverished Cape Flats communities, indicating that there is some measure of trust in the Office of the Ombudsman.
the recommendations made to the SAPS. 61 None of these requirements was met in the 2015/2016 annual report. Subsequent annual reports should reflect more closely on steps taken by the Ombudsman to improve policecommunity relations and, more specifically, on how the police have responded and if the responses had the desired effect.
Conclusion
The Western Cape, through the WCCSA, is pushing for a stronger oversight relationship with the SAPS, even though its powers are significantly curtailed by the Constitution. Nonetheless, it is attempting to make policing more closely aligned to the needs of the Western Cape and to hold the police accountable to the extent possible under the Constitution. National government was resistant to the Western Cape's appointment of a commission of inquiry into policecommunity relations, and made this very clear in its opposition to the Khayelitsha Commission. While there may have been talk of similar opposition to the WCCSA, this did not materialise and the Constitutional Court has now affirmed that provincial governments have a legitimate interest in improved policing, and that they can engage in a range of functions towards this end, including establishing judicial commissions of inquiry. The Constitutional Court did not deal with the Ombudsman in the Khayelitsha Commission case, as it was not raised by either party, but since national government has not publicly opposed it and the office was established, we can conclude that it is now an accepted part of the Western Cape oversight architecture and the devolution of power.
Whether other provinces will embark on a similar route is probably unlikely as long as they are controlled by the same political party that controls national government. However, it is safe to conclude that policing needs vary What seems to be lacking from the annual report is data giving insight into the impact of the Ombudsman; information that would reflect in some way whether complaints investigations and reports made by the Ombudsman have improved police-community relations, and if there has been a change in police performance. No information is provided on how complaints were resolved, the nature of recommendations made to the SAPS, and what the SAPS's reaction to these complaints was. This lack of detail is regrettable as such information may give insight into the effectiveness of the Ombudsman. As noted above, the WCCSA requires that the Ombudsman must report in its annual report on the activities under its mandate, including the number of investigations, their outcome, and across the provinces and also at local level, and for this reason it is necessary to devolve oversight accordingly. Even if such oversight has a limited mandate, it should contribute to addressing current poor police-community relations and bring about more accountable and responsive policing. The other provinces will therefore be wise to monitor how the Western Cape approach unfolds over the next three to five years.
The Ombudsman faces a number of significant challenges and this should temper expectations as to its impact. The office has a tiny budget at this stage (some R7 million) and this has implications for its capacity to investigate, as well as its accessibility to the province's population. The provincial government may review its allocation if there is evidence of a high demand for its services and that the Ombudsman is effective in fulfilling its mandate when intervening. A further challenge for the Ombudsman is its limited powers regarding police conduct. The Ombudsman's recommendations are not binding, and thus it has to rely on moral authority and the powers of persuasion. Fortunately, the Ombudsman can rely on the provincial executive as well as the provincial legislature to apply pressure on the police to improve performance, although this reliance may be tempered if the political dispensation reverts to an ANCcontrolled province.
With only one office in Cape Town, the Ombudsman will have to do a fair amount of promotional work to inform the public of its functions, and also to report on successes in order to build confidence in its independence and effectiveness in addressing poor policing and poor police-community relations. We know very little about how the police regard the Ombudsman and its recommendations, but it is safe to predict that the relationship will likely be strained and that the police will be resistant to implementing its recommendations.
The Ombudsman will need the support of the executive to make headway in this regard. However, if the SAPS can see the benefits of the Ombudsman's interventions, this will surely foster stronger cooperation. 3 Khayelitsha is a partially informal settlement in Cape Town (Western Cape) with a population of some 400 000 people, according to the 2011 census. The population is mainly isiXhosa speaking and socio-economic deprivation is severe. 
